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FIRST SEMESTER M.A. DEGREE EXAMINATION, DECEMBER 2016

(CUCSS)

Economics

	EC	01 C01—MICROECONOMIC	$\mathbf{S}:\mathbf{T}$	HEORY AND APPLICATIONS-I
		(2015	Admis	sions)
Time :	Three H	ours		Maximum: 36 Weightage
			Part A	
		Answei	all que	estions.
1.	Ordinal	measure of utility is required in	:	
	(a)	Revealed preference.	(b)	Utility.
	(c)	Indifference curve.	(d)	None.
2.	St.Pete	rsburg paradox was formulated b	y:	
	(a)	Hicks.	(b)	Samuelson.
	(c)	Bernoulli.	(d)	Neumann.
3.	The fac	ctor intensity is the ———.		
	(a)	Capital-labour ratio.	(b)	Technological progress.
	(c)	Elasticity of factors.	(d)	Marginal product of factors.
4.	The CI	ES production function exhibits :		
	(a)	Increasing return to scale.	(b)	Constant return to scale.
	(c)	decreasing return to scale.	(d)	None.
5.	Averag	ge fixed cost can be obtained thro	ugh :	
	(a)	AFC = TFC/TC.	(b)	AFC = TFC/MC.
	(c)	AFC = TC + TVC.	(d)	AFC = MC + TVC.
6	. Duops	ony is a market situation which is	s charac	terised by the existence of:
	(a)	One buyer	(h)	Two huvers

(d) None.

(c) Three buyers four buyers.

7.	. Who wrote the famous book, Economics of imperfect competition?				
	(a)	A.C.Pigou.	(b)	Chamberlin.	
	(c)	Roabinson.	(d)	Marx.	
8.	What is the market situation where there is no leader and no follower?				
	(a)	Partial oligopoly.	(b)	Full oligopoly.	
	(c)	Open oligopoly.	(d)	Collusive oligopoly.	
9.	. A full fledged managerial theory of the firm has been put forward by:				
	(a)	Williamson.	(b)	Marris.	
	(c)	Cyert.	(d)	None.	
10.	0. If the two firms can sign a binding contract to share the profits between them from the production and sales, the game is called:				
	(a)	Economic game.	(b)	Co-operative game.	
	(c)	Dominant strategy.	(d)	None.	
11.	1. Limit price is called:				
	(a)	Entry preventing price.	(b)	Potential entry of firm.	
	(c)	Actual entry of firm.	(d)	None.	
12.	_	ortant game model that has signly known as :	gnificant i	mplications for the behaviour of the oligopolists is	
	(a)	Instability of cartel.	(b)	Saddle point.	
	(c)	Prisoners dilemma.	(d)	All.	
				$(12 \times \frac{1}{4} = 3 \text{ weightage})$	
			Part I	3	
		Answe	r any five	questions.	
13.	Risk lov	ver.			
14.	Snob ef	fect.			
15.	Linearly homogeneous production function.				
16.	Short run cost function.				
17.	Cartel.				
18.	Co-oper	rative game.			

- 19. Economies of scale.
- Limit pricing model by Jagadish Bhagwati.

 $(5 \times 1 = 5 \text{ weightage})$

Part C

Answer any eight questions.

- 21. Friedman Sawage hypothesis.
- 22. Characteristic theory of demand.
- 23. CES production function.
- 24. Habitat creation principle.
- 25. Modern theory of cost.
- 26. Chamberlin model of oligopoly.
- 27. Types of price leadership.
- 28. Features of game.
- 29. Sylos labini model of limit pricing.
- 30. Household portfolio decision under risk.
- 31. Harrodian approach to technical progress.

 $(8 \times 2 = 16 \text{ weightage})$

Part D

Answer any three questions.

- 32. Marris model of balanced growth.
- 33. Collusive models of oligopoly.
- 34. Significance of game theory in economic analysis.
- 35. Merits and demerits of Cobb Douglas production function over CES production function.
- Pragmatic approach to demand analysis.

 $(3 \times 4 = 12 \text{ weightage})$